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An Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come?
James J. Tritten
Since 1945, a "Revolution in Military Affairs," created by
the advent of nuclear weapons, has focused arms control attention
primarily on strategic and other nuclear weapons. Limiting con-
ventional forces, other naval weapons and other aspects of naval
warfare has been somewhat ignored. But this is changing. Euphoria
over the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) arms
control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union,
"glasnost," "peristroika, " the new defensive military doctrine in
the Soviet Union, and a new American administration anxious to
curb the growth rate of military expenditures, will likely shift
new attention on naval and other forms of arms control.
^
Supporters of naval arms control argue that controlling the
fleet produces substantial benefits. First, the likelihood of war
is reduced because of reduced military capabilities and a lessen-
ing of the fear over who could make a first strike. Secondly, if
a war breaks out, the limited availability of weapons reduces the
consequences or outcome. And thirdly, there is a possible reduc-
tion in the costs of maintaining a fleet because of the limita-
tion of weaponry. These costs can also be reduced as Allies
increasingly assume a larger share of the overall defense burden.
But what are some of the most recently proposed naval arms
control initiatives and what are their possible consequences in
relation to our naval force operations and restrictions on the
development of our future technology? This paper will focus on
initiatives in three main areas: strategic antisubmarine warfare,
naval operations, and technology.
Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare
Some civilians in the academic community question certain
offensive operations called "strategic" antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) or ASW operations against strategic nuclear-powered ballis-
tic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs). Proponents suggest that
arms controls regulate such operations. Proposals to restrict
deployments of SSBNs and place limitations on strategic ASW have
been around for years, attracting the support of former US Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter, and more recently, Soviet Communist Party
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and a supporting cast of
military officers and foreign ministry spokesmen.
Most of these proposals create safe zones in which SSBNs can
be deployed. Within these zones, however, all ASW operations are
forbidden. Such zones restrict virtually all warships, hydro-
graphic vessels and other naval auxiliaries from operating in
vast areas of the high seas since it can be argued that even
routine transit by these ships results in their conducting cer-
tain phases of antisubmarine warfare. For example, ships transit-
ing the ocean normally conduct visual and radar (if properly
equipped) search - both forms of active ASW. Even passive search
using basic electronics equipment is expected during the most
routine and innocent transits, and most naval ships carry some
electronic support measures (ESM) equipment.
Will safe zones restrict ASW research (scientific study of
the environment that could advance ASW technology or capability)
as well as actual ASW operations? The logical answer is "yes";
otherwise, a major loophole results allowing treaty circumvention
and non-compliance when a nation claims it is only doing research
and not actual ASW operations. Virtually all military ships
conduct ASW "research" during a normal transit - fathometer
soundings, bathythermograph readings and other routine observa-
tions on the condition of the seas. Therefore, a ban on ASW
research again implies a ban on the passage of any ship capable
of conducting these basic readings.
If ASW safe areas cause difficulties for naval ships, we
should consider the difficulties similar restrictions place on
fishing vessels and merchant ships. All ships flying the Soviet
flag are state owned. Many civilian ships in the West are con-
tracted for military related support services; hence, any visual
or radar searches, fathometer soundings, bathythermograph read-
ings, sea state recordings, or studies of marine biology by these
ships is considered State run ASW operations or research. An ASW
free zone, therefore, will be off limits to any state owned or
contracted merchant or fishing vessel. Having vast areas of the
ocean forbidden to transit by national flag vessels is clearly
not in the best interest of either superpower. How would the US
fishing, oil, and minerals industries react to being told that
they could not conduct routine ocean observations or exploration
in the Gulf of Alaska?
In analyzing such an arms control regime, verification prob-
lems abound. For example, if the West wishes to demonstrate that
the Soviet Union is not complying with ASW restrictions or re-
strictions on the use of "safe" areas, but can only do so by
exposing its own sophisticated technical or intelligence capabil-
ities, it must chose between exposing the non-compliance and the
related intelligence source or not publicizing the violation.
Unfortunately, democracies have a poor track record generally
choosing not to publicize "minor" violations, thus inviting
totalitarian nations to take even further liberties with
treaties
.
Even if a nation can verify compliance, the net effect of any
restrictions on strategic ASW or SSBN operations benefits the
Soviet Union more than the West. In effect, such an arms control
regime demands that the West identify the ocean areas in which
its strategic missile-carrying submarines are deployed, something
that we now avoid at all costs. Identification of deployment
areas in order to designate ASW free zones greatly eases Soviets
ASW search problems. Simply put, we will greatly reduce the
rather large area of the world's oceans where the Soviet Union
likes to look for US SSBNs. If we identify where to look for
SSBNs, we probably weaken Western deterrence, including the
deterrent umbrella extended by the US over its non-nuclear Al-
lies .
The US has never built up to the maximum number of SSBNs
allowable under the SALT I agreement. As we reduce the number of
SSBNs further, it is in our and our Allies interests to keep the
Soviet's search problem as complicated as possible, as a hedge
against the long-predicted Soviet breakthrough in ASW. Although
many political scientists warn us that the oceans are about to
become transparent (that scientists will discover a means to make
ocean waters so clear that submarines hidden beneath the surface
will be visible from the skies), this breakthrough is still not
imminent. Soviet military strategy, however, explicitly requires
the use of strategic ASW against enemy missile-carrying subma-
rines in time of war. Here we should keep up our guard against a
possible Soviet breakthrough in ASW capability.
Reduction of SSBN hulls in the future has three possible
implications of major importance. First, substantially reducing
the number of targets for Soviet strategic ASW action is a prob-
lem that must be constantly monitored by government intelligence
agencies who assess enemy ASW warfare capabilities. If we re-
duced the number of SSBNs to say 17 or 18, using a rule of thumb
that 2/3 of that force might normally be on patrol, then the
Soviets and their allies would only have to search for 12 targets
during normal peacetime patrols. Similarly, if Soviet SSBN num-
bers are reduced significantly, this will have an effect upon
planned maritime operations in time of war and therefore in the
planned procurement of antisubmarine warfare capable forces in
the West in time of peace.
Secondly, if the number of Soviet SSBNs are reduced, the
Soviet Navy will likely have surplus general purpose (submarine,
surface and air) forces to send into areas of the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans in time of war. Similarly, the possible reduction
in the number of SSBNs in the West might have an impact in both
our planned buy of cruise missile-carrying forces and convention-
al antisubmarine warfare forces necessary for the defense of
convoys against a threat now enhanced by these extra Soviet
forces
.
Thirdly, no future arms control agreements with the USSR
involving nuclear weapons should give them a unilateral advantage
in the use of ballistic missile submarine hulls nor exclude the
diesel-electric ballistic missile submarines and intermediate-
range naval land-based nuclear cruise missile forces^ currently
found in the Soviet Fleets. The USSR was granted unilateral
superiority in SALT I submarine hull and launcher numbers due to
supposed technological inferiority. That mistake must not be
repeated.
Just as the possession of nuclear weapons by third nations
is an obstacle in SALT, START, and other arms control negotia-
tions, the possession of missile-carrying submarines and ASW
forces by other nations certainly complicates any of the general
purpose naval arms control proposals mentioned. For example, will
the United Kingdom or France deploy their SSBNs in the open ocean
if the US and Soviet Union limit their submarines to safe zones?
If so, the survivability of these Allied submarines is question-
able since they will have to face greater numbers of Soviet ASW
forces directed specifically at them. The US generally takes the
position that it cannot and will not negotiate Allied nuclear
forces while the Soviet Union views all weapons that are capable
of hitting its homeland as "strategic."
Similarly, if Soviet ASW forces are not allowed to enter the
US ASW-free or "safe" areas, will East German, North Korean, or
Cuban forces be used instead? Reflagging is an ancient maritime
tradition which can be used to reduce the effectiveness of any
arms control regime, making treaty compliance virtually impossi-
ble to enforce. If reflagging is not used, what will prevent
each nation from benefiting from the ASW or ASW research conduct-
ed by its allies? One might consider that allies could act as
sub-contractors to ensure continued mission performance even in
the face of an arms control regime.
In general, any arms control limitations on antisubmarine
warfare significantly reduces the opportunities for gathering
intelligence, a part of our national technical means (NTMs) of
verifying compliance with existing arms control agreements. Most
people eguate NTMs with satellite activities. Naval forces,
however, have the right of transit and the right to gather intel-
ligence on the high seas. If sea operations are restricted be-
cause they are conducted without the use of radar, visual and ESM
"ASW" search eguipment, these same naval forces might not be able
to perform necessary observation missions verifying the arms
control treaty itself. Most proponents of naval arms control do
not understand the adverse effect that their proposals would have
on current agreements.
Restrictions on Naval Operations
Other Soviet recommendations for naval arms control include
restricting major maritime exercises to one or two each year.
Asymmetries in national methods of attaining fleet readiness
underlie this proposal. The Soviets believe they maintain high
readiness by not exercising their fleet at sea, but by maintain-
ing an alert status in port or at an anchorage. Virtually all
other navies believe maintaining readiness is accomplished by
maximizing the amount of time they remain underway at sea in an
operational status. Restricting at-sea time might appear attrac-
tive to a new Administration anxious to lower the Department of
Defense budgets by lowering operating and maintenance costs;
however, such limits on exercises while satisfactory for conti-
nental powers like the Soviet Union, are clearly impractical for
historic seapowers like the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, or Japan.
In addition, proposals to limit the number and location of
deployments by certain types of forces has also been suggested by
the USSR. For example, the deployment of a battleship into the
Baltic Sea caused an adverse reaction by a Soviet spokesman.
Deployment by aircraft carrier battle groups near the Soviet
homeland are operations the Russians also prefer to regulate.
Fortunately, we have a nice historical record of Soviet compli-
ance with such naval arms control with the Montreaux Treaty of
1936. Although one can argue that the USSR has not violated the
exact letter of the treaty and in the end it is a political
document subject to the interpretation of the government of
Turkey, the record speaks of a nation that has not been faced
with any restriction that it would not find a way around.
Proposals on specific ship deployments besides being asym-
metric and self-serving have two major flaws. First, they under-
mine the principle of navigational freedom so vital to our mili-
tary forward deployment strategy and our economic well being. I
believe this principle is more important to this nation and its
Allies and trading partners than any benefit we may derive from
limiting fleet deployments by the Soviets. Secondly, deployment
limits undermine deterrence, especially of our major Allies on
exposed flanks. Major fleet task forces of the US Navy remain a
visible deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Norwegian Sea and
Eastern Mediterranean and as a reminder of our commitment to
defend the exposed flanks of Iceland, Norway, Greece and Turkey.
If the Soviets desire reduced US naval presence in these areas,
they must be prepared to give up something of equal value.
Soviet proposals for zones of peace or nuclear free zones at
sea are additional long standing proposals that would adversely
complicate US Navy operations. Such zones lend themselves to
large regional varieties, such as a zone of peace for the Indian
Ocean, or in more limited geographic areas, like the Baltic Sea.
Aggregated on a map, they virtually encircle the Soviet Union
providing a defensive buffer. National defense is a laudable goal
for any nation, and we can appreciate a genuine Soviet desire to
maintain its security; however, peace zones and nuclear free
zones are fragments of the Kremlin's wide-ranging tactics under-
mining regional, hence global stability by excluding the US and
Western sea powers from vital areas, even if they do it one small
step at a time.^ If one looks at a map of the world with the
Soviet Union at the center, zones of peace are seen to naturally
complement the already overwhelming zones of active and passive
defenses that encircle that nation.
There has been some past success with nuclear weapons free
zones, space being a case in point. Space, however, is not free
of nuclear material and we must simply believe that nuclear
powered satellites cannot be "converted" into nuclear weapons by
the toggle of a switch from a control panel on earth. Similar
concerns need addressing if a nuclear weapons free zone is dis-
cussed regarding our vast open seas. One of the best examples of
a zone of peace is the de-militarization of the Great Lakes by
the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817. What is rarely mentioned, howev-
er, is the general disregard for this treaty's provisions since
the time of the American Civil War. How many Americans realize
that the US Navy even had training aircraft carriers in the Great
Lakes during World War II?
Zones of peace or nuclear free zones at sea would also tend
to undermine the NATO strategy of flexible response, which in-
cludes options other than immediate escalation to a major nuclear
war if NATO faces conventional defeat on land. Retaining a full
spectrum of war fighting options, including the ability to initi-
ate limited nuclear war from the sea, remains in the best inter-
ests of the NATO nations. Nuclear free zones are generally
proposed in such areas that this option would be more difficult.
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As stated earlier, if the Soviets are fearful of Western
naval capabilities and are anxious to enter into serious negotia-
tions, they should offer something of equal value. Soviet naval
forces are not central to Soviet decision-making and are not an
appropriate quid pro quo for reductions in the US Navy. As former
Secretary of Defense Carlucci said, our naval capabilities and
seaborne shipping should be equated with the Soviets capabilities
to reinforce and resupply the Eastern European empire - roads and
railways. ^ The importance of land transportation to the economies
of Warsaw Treaty nations is of approximately the same importance
as sea transportation in the West. If the idea of restrictions on
roads and railways proves unnegotiable, why not consider the size
of Soviet ground forces and their impressive system for military
and industrial mobilization?
Restrictions on Technology
Other Soviet arms control proposals include limiting techno-
logical development of strategic ASW. This proposal assumes we
can distinguish between "strategic" ASW and "tactical" ASW
tactical ASW involving the hunting and elimination of submarines
that do not carry ballistic or long-range cruise missiles. Obvi-
ously, proponents of this cavalier idea have little first hand
operational sea experience.
Attempting to regulate strategic antisubmarine warfare
technology without imposing similar restrictions on operational
or tactical antisubmarine warfare technology is obviously neither
practical nor in the best interests of NATO nations. If the
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success of NATO defense strategy continues to depend upon the
reinforcement/resupply of Europe from North America in the event
of conventional war, Allies will require the most advanced ASW
warfare techniques to get convoys across the Atlantic. In con-
trast, Warsaw Pact nations can fight in Europe without relying on
vulnerable sea transportation and are thus in a better position
to handle ASW technology restrictions.
If we agree to such restrictions and accept increased vulner-
ability to our seaborne shipping, will arms control advocates
agree to increase the capabilities of intercontinental air trans-
portation and the defense of the air ways? Probably not. Their
likely recommendation will be to regulate air transportation as
well, leaving us with no real way to ensure that men and material
can get across the Atlantic!
How can we even attempt to regulate the development of ASW
technology so that it will only be used to find submarines not
carrying strategic nuclear missiles? How can we regulate the
passage of warships or State-owned merchant ships through the
high seas and ensure that they are not finding submarines when
they must search for other ships in order to avoid collisions?
How can we ensure that the Soviet Union will comply with such
restrictions and what will we do if we discover one of their
fishing vessels has reported sighting one of our submarines? The
US cannot gamble on surrendering its lead in ASW (or other)
technological developments by agreeing to restrictions in a
future arms control regime.
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Restrictions on antisubmarine warfare technology will also
result in unrealistic requirements in our intelligence collection
operations. How do we intend to monitor what is going on in
Soviet bloc laboratories? If development of certain types of
weapons or intelligence collection systems constitute the measure
of effectiveness for ASW technology, it is possible the strict
constructionist in the USSR will simply develop alternative
unregulated devices to achieve the same results.
There is a significant lesson here relating to actions taken
by the Soviet Union regarding ballistic missile defense despite
Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty provisions. Most people in
the West believe ballistic missile defense was outlawed by the
ABM Treaty. Intelligence collection was concentrated on inspec-
tion measures of ABM defense as specified by the Treaty. We did
not look at proliferation and mobility of missiles and hardening
of silos - alternative and unregulated means of defense against
ballistic missiles. Thus, the Soviets achieved ballistic missile
defense via methods not regulated by the treaty while the US gave
up the goal of ballistic missile defense.
The Goal of Arms Control
Arms control does not simply mean the signing of treaties.
Worthwhile arms control agreements should accomplish at least one
of the following: (1) reduce the likelihood of war; (2) reduce
the consequences of war; and/or (3) reduce costs. These measures
should, however, be integrated into a national security policy in
conjunction with the national security of our Allies.
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A typical example used by arms control enthusiasts to "demon-
strate" the advantage of naval arms control is the Washington
Naval Arms Conference. ^ The conference placed major constraints
only on building then-"strategic" weapons - capital ships and
aircraft carriers. There were no regulations for building subma-
rines and only limited regulations for construction of other
warships. The monetary savings achieved in the 1920s by the US
not building capital ships was negated by expenses incurred
during the 1930s naval arms buildup. Can we seriously argue then
that the Washington Conference met any of the three fundamental
goals of arms control? Is the record better if we add in the
naval arms control provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, the
1930 and 1936 London Treaty and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval
Agreement? No.
One of the major lessons learned from previous naval arms
control negotiations is that such negotiations not only limit
necessary preparation for deterrence, but deter democracies from
exposing totalitarian nations who openly violate such agreements.
During the inter-war period, Germany, Italy and Japan built
warships exceeding limits set forth in arms control and other
treaties, a fact that was actively hidden by at least one major
democracy." No one should seriously argue that previous naval
arms control accomplished and of the three substantive goals of
arms control.
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What Can be Done Today?
Actions can be taken to meet the real objectives of arms
control. An exchange of military academicians is a useful first
step. The USSR can help the West better understand its military
doctrine and strategy and its internal debates about these
issues. We must be assured that their doctrine and strategy are
no longer based on war-fighting concepts against the West which
limit damage to the USSR and offensive first-strike operations.
The best way of dealing with the Soviets is in the same way that
they see themselves, rather than in some theoretically "rational"
manner that only makes sense to a Western civilian academic.
Perhaps the military officers of both countries could write on
military doctrine and strategy in each other's professional
journals. Such a proposal should not be left to chance but
should be organized by the two nation's militaries. Similar
writings by academics should also be encouraged.
Though the US would like to see military vulnerability ac-
cepted in the USSR so that it can decide that Mutual Assured
Destruction ("MAD") described the state of the world, it is up to
the Soviets to demonstrate in both word and deed that their past
behavior and policies have now changed. As a first step, the USSR
can dismantle its most threatening first-strike intercontinental
ballistic missiles or cease deployment of new land-based mobiles
missiles that might cause the US to counter with similar systems.
These would be first steps in naval arms control since our abili-
ty to accept regulations at sea depend to a large degree upon
what happens upon the land.
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Each superpower must recognize that its views of a logical
deterrent posture can appear as a threat to the other side.
Existing Soviet land-based ballistic missiles that directly
threaten our Minutemen and Peacekeeper missiles, an extremely
robust defense against bombers and cruise missiles, a commitment
to ballistic missile defense and an aggressive ASW research and
development program coupled with what we know to have been Soviet
military strategy are aggressive measures toward capturing over-
all military superiority rather than merely providing a "reasona-
bly sufficient" defense. Each side must monitor the external
images that its rhetoric, force structure, deployments and exer-
cises portray to the other.
Supporters of naval arms control need to wrestle with major
problems in all of the above proposals before Soviet recommenda-
tions can be taken seriously by the US. One of the most important
considerations is whether or not such restrictions remain in
place during an armed conflict. The definition of armed conflict
proves as elusive as defining a warship, the issue there being
whether or not Coast Guard and KGB forces, national revenue
service or grey-painted merchant marine units are or should be
classified as warships. If superpowers can agree on definitions,
their next move may be sharing war gaming and political/military
simulation capabilities to assist in the agreement on the impacts
of any proposed arms control restrictions. Granted such simula-
tions would be necessarily guarded but they might prove a good
opportunity to understand the way that each side looks at mili-
tary problems. More importantly, they might aid each side in
16
developing the measures of effectiveness that it needs to model
the behavior of the other nation.
Even now there are some modest arms control measures that
can be pursued, clearly peripheral measures that do not involve
major or central military weapons systems. Actions reducing
excessive Soviet military general forces capabilities and over-
seas deployments rather than mere words are significant confi-
dence building measures. Agreements on notification of ballistic
missile tests and on the prevention of dangerous military activi-
ties were recently signed. Perhaps we can agree on advance noti-
fication of naval exercises as well. Past experiences, however,
with advance notification of exercises which are regulated by the
existing Helsinki and Stockholm accords, should form a backdrop
for negotiations.
The existing seventeen year old bilateral incidents at sea
agreement and more recent high level meetings between the mili-
tary staffs of each superpower appear as constructive measures in
minimizing potential crises arising out of every day military
operations and maximizing communications on a professional level.
Open exchange of non-sensitive data, such as the homeport of
major ships, can also be non-threatening to the US Navy since
this data is generally known. Expanding the incidents at sea
agreement to include non-interference with submarine or aircraft
operations might also be looked into.
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Nations may even risk open confirmation that some of their
major warships do not carry nuclear weapons. US Army and Air
Force denials to other countries that bases or forces are nuclear
capable are commonplace. If we already exchange inspectors be-
cause of the new INF Treaty, why not exchange additional data
during major exercises?
Although nuclear free zones or zones of peace may not neces-
sarily be a good idea for the West, they represent a reasonably
good fallback position if the US Navy is strongly encouraged to
engage in naval arms control by an insistent Secretary of De-
fense, President, or Congress. Simply put, it is far better to
promise to not deploy nuclear (or other) weapons in specific
geographic locations than to not build them at all. In the event
that the agreement fails, it is far more easy to recover from the
former than the latter.
Similarly, no first nuclear use at sea is another concept
worth exploring. In my opinion, it is not in the interest of the
US Navy to fight a nuclear war at sea. The Soviet Union probably
would benefit if it were to go nuclear and get in the first
strike at sea yet it promises not to go nuclear first. If the US
promises to not go nuclear first and ties the deterrence of
nuclear war at sea (as it does now) to a threat to expand the war
to the shore, then this would probably be acceptable to our own
and NATO strategists although the principle of flexible response
would be undermined.
Perhaps the US Navy could suffer the loss of some of its
18
Perhaps the US Navy could suffer the loss of some of its
tactical nuclear weaponry at sea. If this is what we are doing
anyway, then why not make this reduction a part of an arms con-
trol regime instead of a unilateral budgetary or programming
action. We must guard, however, against too deep a reduction so
as to not either affect our war-fighting needs or our deterrence
of tactical nuclear war at sea.
One final area that we might have to look at is that of
Permissive Action Links (PALs). PALs require receipt of an
active signal for the firing of a nuclear device. PALs are found
on strategic bombers and in the system for the launch of land-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although generally
impractical for our SSBNs (and a highly emotional issue for the
crews involved), what has been our acceptance of this principle
with sea-based cruise missiles? PALs constitute one more compo-
nent that might break down or be interfered with. They thus
represent another opportunity for ballistic missile defense and
strategic ASW for the Soviets. Yet, might we not compromise and
accept PALs rather than risk more degrading measures?
The US Navy must develop a non-threatening position on arms
control minimizing any impact on the ability of our fleet to
perform peacetime and wartime missions. We need to alleviate the
perception that the Navy is stonewalling on arms control. Fortu-
nately the Navy is doing serious internal staff work on all these
issues and will be well equipped to handle the policy questions
of the next few years.
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In the absence of a comprehensive global arms control re-
gime, I doubt whether it is wise or possible to single out spe-
cific regions where naval operations should be regulated by new
arms control measures. Perhaps the best thing that naval officers
can do is explain why there must not be a stand-alone "naval"
arms control agreement and why we should not even use the term
"naval arms control." It is an issue that will not go away nor
one that can be handled by uniformed officers alone.
A meaningful arms control agreement involving naval forces
must be accompanied by a comprehensive plan regulating virtually
all nuclear and non-nuclear forces and activities, and involve
nations including more than just the two superpowers. Any nation
currently allied with the US and any nation that desires the
option of future aid from an American fleet has a major stake in
ensuring that the Soviets do not restrict US maritime operations.
The issues involved with the naval arms control suggestions
discussed herein should demonstrate the growing complexity of
modern warfare. Neat distinctions between the offense and de-
fense or even nuclear and non-nuclear warfare and warfare in one
theater are almost meaningless without consideration of the rest
of the equation. If warfare is this complex, it is obvious that
we cannot consider arms control with such outmoded concepts as
regulations involving only certain areas of the world or certain
types of weapons systems. All future crises and wars between the
superpowers will be both automatically global and nuclear. In
some of them, the crisis or war will have not yet expanded to a
20
new area of confrontation and hopefully in all of them, the
nuclear weapons have not yet been used.
I believe the current or projected nuclear or maritime
balance of forces between the US and USSR both in the any single
region and worldwide is not so severe that immediate arms control
is needed. Wars do not begin by events that happen on the sea.
The two superpowers are adjusting to new technological opportuni-
ties and political realities and need time to come to a mutual
understanding. Although it is extremely fashionable in the US and
the West to think of arms control in terms of a "non-zero sum
game," in which one side does not gain advantage over the other,
arms control as a part of an overall national security strategy
properly places it in the "zero sum game camp." Arms control
strategy is competitive strategy where one side gains an advan-
tage over the other.
Where to start the process is an interesting exercise. On
the one hand, strategists often start with some concept of the
threat. The strategist tries to deal with this threat. On the
other hand, the arms controller often starts his thinking process
with the goal. Both arms control enthusiasts and strategists may
be forced to begin the process with the output of the budgeter
and Congress; i.e. the resources available and not necessarily
the threat or the goal.
More importantly, we need to think through the naval arms
control issue and move ahead of the Soviets in more effectively
handling the press and informing the American public of the
21
issues involved. Well thought out alternative proposals should be
presented by active-duty naval officers with help from civilian
academic personnel and arms control supporters. The US Navy
cannot refuse to participate in naval arms control strategy. By
applying logic and experience in seeking the best for the nation,
the Bush Administration can initiate negotiations. We must not
forget, however, that until we fully understand the internal
changes ongoing in Mikhail Gorbachev's "restructured" Soviet
Union, there will be nothing so threatening about the
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